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INTRODUCTION

Recent advances in biotechnology promise tremendous benefits, including fastgrowing, resilient crops, more nutritious foods, new medicines and vaccines, and even new
technologies for environmental decontamination. Yet modem biotechnology also inspires
fear and trepidation. Greenpeace International, one of the leading anti-biotechnology
environmentalist groups, warns that geneticaily modified crops "threaten biodiversity,
wildlife and truly sustainable forms of agriculture."' Luddite activist Jeremy Rifkin warns
that "[v ]irtuaiiy every geneticaiiy engineered organism released into the environment poses
a potential threat to the ecosystem . . . . Each new synthetic introduction is tantamount to
playing ecological roulette." 2 Some believe genetic engineering is part of a "human siege

t Jonathan H. Adler Uadler@cei.org) is a senior fellow in environmental policy at the Competitive
Enterprise Institute in Washington, D.C. The author would like to thank David Barrett, John Cohrssen, Gregory
Conko, Michael Gough, and Ken Green for their input and comments. Any errors or spotty arguments are the
author's alone.
Genetically
Engineered
Food
(visited
Jan.
31,
2000)
I. Green peace
International,
<http://www.greenpeace.org/-geneng/reports/food/intrfo06.htm> (chapter 6 entitled Public Concern).
2. Jeremy Rifkin, The Biotech Century, E: ENVTL. MAG., May I 998, at 36.
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on the natural environment" and "agriculture worldwide is at risk" from the introduction of
genetically engineered crops. 3 Others even claim that the "release of transgenic organisms
is much worse than nuclear weapons or radioactive wastes." 4 Until international regulation
is in place, some warn, a global moratorium on the development and utilization of
genetically modified organisms (GMOs) 5 is required. In the meantime, environmentalist
groups continue to protest the increasing use of biotechnology to develop new strains of
ex1stmg crops.
Environmental protesters dumped bushels of genetically-engineered
soybeans in front of British Prime Minister Tony Blair's residence, while others engage in
"eco-terrorism" by destroying fields where newly engineered crops undergo field tests. 6
Like any technological development, the ability to alter living organisms can bring
both good and bad. There are potential benefits, but also potential risks. The full promise
of genetic engineering has yet to be discovered. For some, the possibility of unforeseen
risks is cause for regulation until the uncertainty can be resolved, irrespective of the
benefits that reliance on biotechnology could bring. Advocates of this "precautionary"
approach urge adoption of an international biosafety protocol-negotiated under the United
Nations Convention on Biological Diversity-to regulate the use and international transfer
ofGMOs.
Calls for precautionary regulation of biotechnology may seem compelling-until one
considers the trade-offs. Government regulation of new technology inevitably slows its
development and adoption. At the margin, such regulations increase the costs of
developing and marketing new products and techniques. Imposing additional regulatory
burdens on a given technology lowers the expected returns from new innovations. This, in
turn, provides disincentives for research. As barriers to the marketing of innovations
increase, funding for research will decline. 7 As a result, excessive regulation may sacrifice
the benefits of innovation in the interest of "safety." In the case of biotechnology,
excessive precautionary regulation could, for example, limit the introduction of high-yield
crops, nutritionally-enhanced foodstuffs, or new vaccines. While regulation of new
technology is supposed to make the world a safer place, precautionary regulation of
biotechnology could leave the world less safe than it would be otherwise. In short, an
international biosafety protocol could make us more sorry than safe.
Part I of this paper provides a brief overview of the development of biotechnology, its
regulation and its use, with a particular emphasis on agricultural biotechnology. Part II
outlines the United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, which provides an
international legal framework for a biosafety protocol and summarizes the results of recent
protocol negotiations, such as those conducted in Cartagena, Colombia in February 1999,
3. Karen M. Graziano, Comment, Biosafety Protocol: Recommendations to Ensure the Safety of the
Environment, 7 COLO. J. lNT'L ENVTL. L. & POL 'y 179, !85, !88 ( !996).
4. Dr. Mae-Wan Ho, The Unholy Alliance, ECOLOGIST, July-Aug. !997, at !58.
5. A note on word usage: the terms "genetically modified organism" and "GMO" are somewhat misleading
because they imply a fundamental difference between animals and plants created through recombinant DNA
(rDNA) techniques and those that are the result of other biotechnological techniques. Yet, as discussed in Part
I.A., there is no real scientific difference. Even conventional methods of selection and cross-breeding modify plant
and animal cells at the genetic level. The relative risk posed by an organism is a function of its particular
characteristics and traits, not the method with which it was produced. Nonetheless, "genetically modified
organism" and "GMO" are used throughout this paper as these terms are so widely used in discussions of
biotechnology policy, particularly in the international context.
6. See Pat Murphy, The Raging Debate Over Biotech Foods, Environmental News Network (visited Mar. 8,
2000) <http://www.enn.com/enn-features-archive/2000/03/03052000/gefood_599l.asp> (noting vandalism of
fields planted with genetically modified crops in England).
7. As Willy De Greef, a European plant geneticist, commented to Science regarding proposals for regulation
of biotechnology in Europe, "There's an immense danger in this sort of overregulation . . . . You burden people
with such a load of paper that it deters them from entering the field in the first place." Michael Balter, How
Europe Regulates Its Genes, 252 SCIENCE !366, 1368 (!99!).
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which continued in Montreal in January 2000. Part III explains why the proposed protocol
embodies a variant of the precautionary principle and why such policies may do more harm
than good. This paper concludes with some brief thoughts on how to approach the
potential and uncertain risks and benefits of new technologies in general and of
biotechnology in particular.

II.

BACKGROUND ON BIOTECHNOLOGY

Biotechnology is a broad term that encompasses nearly all human efforts to change
living organisms to facilitate their use. 8 Under the Convention on Biological Diversity, for
example, biotechnology is defined as "any technological application that uses biological
systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make or modify products or processes
for specific use." 9 Under this definition, biotechnology ranges from traditional crossbreeding to the selection of a single gene from one organism for the insertion into another.
In policy discussions, however, the term is generally used to refer to newer biotechnology
techniques, particularly the use of recombinant DNA (rDNA) techniques to modify
organisms at the genetic level. 10 Indeed, this is the only form of biotechnology that is
generally subject to calls for greater regulation.

A.

The Promise (and Potential Pitfalls) ofBiotechnology

Human modification of living organisms is nothing new. 11 For centuries, humans
have selectively bred crops and animals for desirable traits. According to the National
Academy of Sciences, "[a]rtificial selection has been applied to thousands of traits in a vast
array of organisms, ranging from the yeasts used in baking and wine making to the
livestock and plants that constitute a major part of our diet. " 12 What is new is the level at
which such manipulation occurs. In the twentieth century, researchers have learned to
engage in selection at the genetic level.
While humans have engaged in the genetic manipulation of plant and animal species
for centuries, researchers did not discover the structure of DNA until 1953. Gregor Mendel
outlined the basic principles of genetics in the 1860s, but his work was largely ignored until
this century. 13 When James Watson and Frances Crick discovered the double helix
structure of DNA, scientists quickly solved the mystery of genetic replication. Combined
with the insights of Oswald A very and his colleagues who developed bacterial genetics,
Watson and Crick's discovery laid the groundwork for molecular genetics. It was only a

8. See ERIC GRACE, BIOTECHNOLOGY UNZIPPED 2 ( !997) ("[B]iotechnology is an umbrella term that covers
various techniques for using the properties of living things to make products or provide services.").
9. United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, art. 2, 31 I.L.M. 818, 823 ( 1992)
[hereinafter CBD].
10. The European Union's directive on the release of genetically modified organisms, for example, defines a
GMO as "an organism in which the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by
mating and/or natural recombination." Council Directive 901220, art. 2, 1990 0.1: (L 117) 16. This definition
includes the results of chemical and radiation mutagenesis in addition to rONA techniques.
II. Indeed, prior to the 20th century, the term biotechnology was used to describe various uses of living
organisms for fermentation and other purposes. See GRACE, supra note 8, at 2.
12. COMMITTEE ON THE INTRODUCTION OF GENETICALLY ENGINEERED ORGANISMS INTO THE
ENVIRONMENT, INTRODUCTION OF RECOMBINANT DNA-ENGINEERED ORGANISMS INTO THE ENVIRONMENT: KEY
ISSUES 10 ( 1987) [hereinafter COMMITTEE].
13. See Bernard D. Davis, The Background: From Classical to Molecular Genetics, in THE GENETIC
REVOLUTION: PROSPECTS AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS I0 (Bernard D. Davis ed., 1991 ).
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matter of time before scientists were able to isolate specific genetic sequences and identify
their functions. Today, scientists are able to cut and remove specific genes or genetic
sequences from one cell and transplant them into another. This technique is known as
rDNA technology.
The ability of researchers to isolate individual genes through rDNA techniques has
produced an explosion of innovation. Efforts to genetically modify crops and other
organisms now occur with far more precision and predictability. They also expand the
genetic combinations that can be created, as they enable the insertion of a gene from one
organism into almost any other, irrespective of their sexual compatibility or genetic
relation. Thus, a bacterium's ability to create a particular protein that is toxic to certain
insects can be transferred to a crop, or one plant's ability to produce particular nutrients can
be transferred to another.
More traditional forms of bioengineering are less precise and harder to control than
Dt:JA recombination. As the National Academy of Sciences noted, "a mutation made by
traditional techniques may be accompanied by many unknown mutations, which often have
deleterious effects on the organism." 14 Efforts to transfer one gene can lead to the transfer
of other,· unwanted genes, lengthening the time and expense required to develop a new
hybrid with the desired traits. As a result, cross-breeding that once took seven to eight
years or even longer can now be achieved in less than half the time with rDNA
techniques. 15
The fruits of the "new biotechnology," as it is called by some, have been tremendous.
In the past decade alone, numerous new pharmaceuticals and beneficial products have been
developed, from treatments for diabetes and hemophilia to microorganisms that can assist
in pollution cleanup. 16 The use of rDNA techniques has been a particular boon for
agriculture. Scientists have already developed pest- and herbicide-resistant crops, fruits
that ripen slowly or resist frost, and many other modified plants. Acidic and metal-rich
soils stunt agricultural productivity on as much as twelve percent of agricultural land
worldwide, yet researchers are close to developing metal-resistant crop strains that have
been difficult to develop through traditional hybridization techniques. 17 One popular GMO
is a new tomato with increased solid content that improves the taste and texture of tomato
paste and processed sauces. An earlier invention was a recombinant form of cow hormone
that increases production of milk. Other developments still in the workrs include soybeans
that produce healthier oils, rice and grains with greater nutritional content, and bananas and
potatoes that provide doses of vaccines. 18 One company is even trying to develop cotton
that is naturally colored, reducing the need for chemical dyes in textile manufacture.
The use of genetically modified crops has expanded rapidly since their introduction
only a few years ago. Since 1986, researchers around the world have conducted over 2000
field trials with genetically engineered crops. 19 As of 1998, at least 30 million hectares

14. COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at II.
15. See Richard A. Melcher et al., Field of Genes, Bus. WK., Apr. 12, 1999, at 64.
16. A listing of various products and processes produced through biotechnology can be found on the
Biotechnology Industry Organization website <http://www.bio.org>. Examples of biotechnology drugs and
vaccines approved by the FDA in the 1980s and late 1990s for various conditions include OncoScint® CRIOV
(colorectal and ovarian cancer), Proleukin® (renal cell carcinoma), Humulin® (diabetes), KoGENate®
(hemophilia A), Alferon® N (genital warts), and Engerix-B® (hepatitis B). See HENRY I. MILLER, POLICY
CONTROVERSY IN BIOTECHNOLOGY: AN INSIDER'S VIEW 5-7 (1997).
17. See Anne Simon Moffat, Engineering Plants to Cope with Metals, 285 SCIENCE 369,369 (1999).
18. See Anne Simon Moffat, Toling Up the Early Harvest of Transgenic Plallls, 282 SCIENCE 2176, 2178
(1998).
19. See GRACE, supra note 8, at 109.
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were planted with genetically modified crops around the globe. 20 In the United States,
crops altered with rDNA techniques now account for at least forty-five percent of cotton,
thirty-eight percent of soybeans, and twenty-five percent of com grown. 21 Current
estimates place the market for genetically engineered crops and derived products at $4
billion, and this value is expected to hit $20 billion within five years. 22
The scientific community, on the whole, has been supportive of these developments
and unconvinced that biotechnology poses substantial risks to human health or to the
environment. 23 Most scientific reports stress that rDNA techniques are merely the latest
form of genetic selection practiced by humanity and that the risks of new GMOs should be
evaluated based upon the characteristics of the particular organism in question, not whether
rDNA techniques were used to create it. For instance, in a 1987 review of the potential
impact of releasing rDNA-engineered organisms into the environment, an expert panel
convened by the Council of the National Academy of Sciences concluded that "[t]here is no
evidence that unique hazards exist either in the use of R-DNA techniques or in the transfer
of genes between unrelated organisms." 24 According to the Council, the risks posed by the
release of GMOs into the environment, while real, "are the same in kind" as those posed by
the introduction of unmodified organisms. 25 In its 1989 review of biotechnology, the
National Research Council similarly concluded that "no conceptual distinction exists
between genetic modification of plants and microorganisms by classical methods or by
molecular techniques that modify DNA and transfer genes." 26
Perhaps the strongest conclusions came from the 1992 report of the National
Biotechnology Policy Board, which concluded that
[t]he risks associated with biotechnology are not unique, and tend to be
associated with particular products and their applications, not with the
production process or the technology per se. In fact, biotechnology processes
tend to reduce risk because they are more predictable. The health and
environmental risks of not pursuing biotechnology-based solutions to the
nation's problems are likely to be greater than the risks of going forwardY
Most private scientific groups reached similar conclusions. The Ecological Society of
America, while a bit more cautious than the National Biotechnology Policy Board,
proclaimed that "[g]enetically engineered organisms should be evaluated and regulated
according to their biological properties (phenotypes), rather than the genetic techniques
used to produce them. " 28
The prestigious British scientific journal Nature editorialized in 1992 that "no
conceptual distinction exists between genetic modification of plants and microorganisms by

20. See Moffat, supra note 18, at 2176.
21. See Siobhan Gonnan, Fulure ?harmers of America, NAT'!.. J., Feb. 6, I999,at 355.
22. See Melcher et al., supra note 15, at 64.
23. See, e.g., Institute of Food Technology, Appropria/e Oversighl for Plan/s wilh lnheriled Trails for
Resislance /o Pesls: A Reporlfrom II Professional Socielies (visited Feb. 19, 2000) <http://www.ift.org/sc/stat>.
24. COMMITTEE, supra note 12, at 6 (emphasis added).
25. !d.
26. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, FIELD TESTING GENETICALLY MODIFIED ORGANISMS: FRAMEWORK
FOR DECISIONS 14 ( 1989).
27. NATIONAL INSTITUTES OF HEALTH, 1992 REPORT OF THE NATIONAL BIOTECHNOLOGY POLICY BOARD, 2
( 1992) [hereinafter NBPB REPORT].
28. James M. Tiedje et al., The Planned Imroduclion of Genelically Engineered Organisms: Eca/ogic:al
Consideralions and Recommendalions, 70 ECOLOGY 298, 298 (1989).
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classical methods or by molecular techniques that modify DNA and transfer genes." 29 In
1999, after years of further research on the potential impacts of biotechnology, Nature
declared again that "[t]here is as yet no substantial evidence that GM [genetically modified]
foods are inherently more dangerous than conventional foods just because they have been
produced using novel techniques." 30 According to Henry Miller, former head of the Food
and Drug Administration's Office of Biotechnology, "[t]he introduction of a new geneeven one in a location unlikely to occur in nature-does not necessarily affect an
organism's relative risk. " 31
Despite the near scientific consensus on relatively minor risks posed by the use of
rDNA techniques, environmental activists are concerned that genetically modified plants
could pose new, unprecedented threats to environmental protection and human health. The
Union of Concerned Scientists calls for stringent regulation of biotechnology and cautions
that "scientists have identified a number of ways in which genetically engineered
organisms could potentially adversely impact both human health and the environment." 32
Karen Graziano, who helped develop the Center for International Environmental Law's call
for a moratorium on the use or development of GMOs, argues that "new combinations of
traits not naturally occurring in the environment can produce unexpected and unwanted
environmental effects." 33 Rachel's Environment & Health Weekly, an anti-technology
environmentalist newsletter, warns that "fundamentally, genetically-engineered crops
substitute human wisdom for the wisdom of nature. " 34 Jeremy Rifkin, a longtime opponent
of all forms of genetic research, calls the introduction of GMOs "the most radical,
uncontrolled experiment we've ever seen." 35 The Institute for Agriculture and Trade
Policy's Kristin Dawkins echoes, "Genetic pollution is considerably more dangerous than
oil spills. You can'tjust go out there and put a boom around it and put it back in." 36
It must be remembered, however, as noted above, that humans have been modifying
the genetic composition of crops since the dawn of agriculture. Research published in early
1999 indicates that the domestication of maize (corn) 7500 years ago was facilitated by
genetic manipulation of teosinte by early farmers. 37
Interestingly enough, the
domestication of maize did not lead to a reduction in its genetic diversity. Rather,
researchers have found that "maize is more genetically diverse than many wild plants,"
including those from which maize was developed. 38
It is a mistake to view modern biotechnology techniques as fundamentally new or
particularly dangerous technologies. Rather, as Henry Miller explains, "[t]he techniques of
the new biotechnology are best viewed as extensions, or refinements, of older techniques
for genetic manipulation and domestication." 39 Just as human efforts to modify other living
organisms are nothing new, concerns about the potential impacts of the hybridization of

29. U.S. Biotechnology Policy, 356 NATURE I, 2 (1992).
30. GM Foods Debate Needs a Recipe for Restoring Trust, 398 NATURE 639, 639 (1999).
31. Henry I. Miller, UN-based Biotechnology Regulation: Scientific and Economic Havoc for the 21st
Century, TRENDS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY, May 1999, at 188.
32. Union of Concerned Scientists, Risks of Genetic Engineering (visited Jan. 28, 2000)
<http://www.ucsusa.org/agriculture/gen.risks.html> [hereinafter UCS].
33. Graziano, supra note 3, at 185.
34. Against the Grain, Part 2, RACHEL's ENVTL. & HEALTH WKL Y., ~ 22 (Feb. 18, 1999)
<http://www.rachel.org/bulletin/bulletin.cfm?issue_ID= 1253&bulletin _!0=48>.
35. Gorman, supra note 21, at 355.
36. Rick Weiss & Justin G,illis, U.S. 'Observers' Lobby Against Trade Curbs on Biotechnology, WASH. POST,
Feb. 13, 1999, at A4.
37. See Svante Paabo, Neolithic Genetic Engineering, 398 NATURE 194, 194 ( 1999).
38. !d.
39. Henry I. Miller, Regulation, in THE GENETIC REVOLUTION: PROSPECTS AND PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS
207--08 (Bernard D. Davis ed., 1991).
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species have been around for a century, if not longer. In 1906, decades before modem
bioengineering methods were even contemplated, plant geneticist Luther Burbank warned:
"We recently advanced our knowledge of genetics to a point where we can manipulate life
in a way never intended by nature. We must proceed with utmost caution in the application
of this new found knowledge." 40
Modified organisms are not risk-free, whether developed through classical or modem
techniques. 41 "There are hidden risks in any form of plant breeding," according to Ben
Miflin, former director of England's Institute of Arable Crops. 42 Efforts to breed better
vegetables with traditional techniques produced dangerously high levels of the natural
carcinogen psora! en in celery and the natural pesticide solanine in potatoes. 43 Yet there is
no evidence that such mishaps are any more likely as a result of genetic recombination
techniques. In fact, many biotechnology proponents argue that such impacts are less likely
because modem genetic engineering techniques enable researchers to insert genes with
more precision. Using the latest techniques, it is less likely that efforts to give a particular
organism a "positive" attribute will transfer a "negative" attribute as well. Nature notes
that in conventional breeding "in addition to introducing a desired trait into a crop from a
wild relative, breeders have no idea what other changes they may have introduced through
the integration oflarge chunks of the donor genome." 44
The Union of Concerned Scientists (UCS), among others, raises additional concems. 45
For instance, the UCS warns that transferring a gene from one organism to another could
trigger allergic reactions, as consumers would be unaware that one product, say carrots,
contained genes from another to which a consumer is allergic.
Pioneer Hi-Bred
discontinued the development of a new soybean modified with a Brazil nut gene when the
company's tests revealed that people allergic to Brazil nuts would also be allergic to the
new soybean. 46
While these risks are conceivable, they are not particularly unique to the use of rDNA
techniques. As the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development found in its
1993 report, although modem biotechnology expands the scope of possible sources of
foods, "this does not inherently lead to foods that are less safe than those developed by
conventional techniques." 47 Allergies, for instance, can be transferred through traditional
cross-breeding techniques.
One prominent concern is that the introduction of modified organisms into the
broader environment could disrupt local ecosystems. The introduction of non-indigenous
animal and plant species, ranging from feral pigs in Hawaii and feral cats in Australia, to
snails in Southeast Asia and kudzu throughout much of the United States, are testament to
40. Thomas P. Redick et al., Private Legal Mechanisms for Regulating the Risks of Genetically Modified
Organisms: An Alternative Path Within the Biosafety Protocol, 4 ENVTL. LAW. I, I 1-12 (I 997).
41. Much the same can be said of any technology, no matter how primitive or advanced.
42. Declan Butler & Tony Reichhardt, Long-term Effect of GM Crops Serves Up Food for Thought, 398
NATURE 651,652 (1999).
43. See Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 851,
873 (I 996). Ironically, in both cases breeders were attempting to develop pest-resistant crops to reduce the need
for conventional pesticides.
44. Butler & Reichhardt, supra note 42, at 653.
45. Most of these concerns are outlined on the UCS web page, see UCS, supra note 32, at I, as well as in
JANE RISSLER & MARGARET MELLON, THE ECOLOGICAL RISKS OF ENGINEERED CROPS ( 1996).
46. See Rick Weiss, Biotech Food Raises a Crop of Questions, WASH. POST, Aug. I5, I 999, at A I. One of
the reasons that Pioneer Hi-Bred opted not to market the modified soybean was a concern for potential liability and
the fact that the FDA was likely to require labeling on products derived from the soybean. See Henry I. Miller, A
Rational Approach to Labeling Biotech-Derived Foods, 284 SCIENCE 1471, 1472 (I 999).
47. MILLER, supra note I 6, at 26.
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the havoc that exotic species can cause. The introduction of exotics is believed to be a
substantial contributor to species extinction. 48 Historically, none of the culprits were
created through modem biotechnology and only a small percentage of introduced species
become destructive pests. As noted above, the additional precision offered by rDNA
techniques, if anything, makes the introduction of a new "pest" species less likely, as it
reduces the chances of inadvertently transferring unwanted genetic traits from one species
to another. Moreover, those traits that are genetically transferred to crops, such as
resistance to a particular chemical or pest, are unlikely to confer any competitive advantage
over wild plants that would lead to a substantial invasion. 49 Indeed, pathogenicity and
"weediness" are functions of multiple genetic traits, so the transfer of one or two is unlikely
to transform a relatively innocuous crop into an invasive or disruptive species. 5°
Concerns about the ecologically disruptive impact of bioengineered crops peaked in
May 1999 with the release of a study suggesting that "Bt" crops threaten butterfly
populations. Bt crops-typically com, cotton, or potatoes-are modified with a gene from
the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) bacterium to produce a natural pesticide, thereby protecting
the crops from pest species, such as the European Com Borer. A preliminary study
published in Nature found that monarch butterfly larvae raised on a diet of leaves dusted
with pollen from Bt com fared worse than those fed leaves with unmodified com pollen or
undusted leaves. 51 Environmental activists seized on this news to urge new limitations, if
not an outright ban, on Bt crops. 52 Yet, it is not clear that the study indicated a serious
threat to butterfly populations. Researchers at the National Biological Impact Assessment
Program at Virginia Tech note that "experts predict little impact on monarch larvae beyond
the edges of Bt corn fields," in large part because the exposure to Bt pollen in the study
were far greater than what could ever be expected in the wild. 53 Indeed, the lead author of
the study commented that the "study was conducted in the laboratory, and ... it would be
inappropriate to draw any conclusions about the risk to monarch populations in the field
based solely on these initial results. " 54
While some of the concerns raised about the use and proliferation of genetically
engineered organisms are legitimate, few, if any, of these concerns are unique to organisms
modified through rDNA techniques. For this reason, most of the scientific community does
not believe that biotechnology requires its own regulatory regime. 55 Nonetheless, in the

48. See Stephen R. Edwards, Conserving Biodiversily: Resources for Our Future, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE
PLANET 222 (Ronald Bailey ed., 1995).
49. See Declan Butler eta!., Assessing the Threat to Biodiversity on the Farm, 398 NATURE 654, 655 ( 1999).
50. See Miller, supra note 39, at 201.
51. See John E. Losey et al., Transgenic Pollen Harms Monarch Larvae, 399 NATURE 214, 214 (1999).
52. Friends of the Earth, for example, issued a letter to President Clinton calling for the cancellation of Bt
crop registrations and new regulations on genetically modified crops. The letter also was signed by representatives
of the Campaign for Food Safety, Community Nutrition Institute, Defenders of Wildlife, Green Choice Party of
New York, Institute for Agriculture and Trade Policy, Migratory Species Project, Organic Consumers Association,
and the Pure Food Alliance of Massachusetts. See Friends of the Earth, Letter to President Clinton (visited Jan.
28, 2000) <http://www.foe.org/safefood/lettertoclinton.html>. The Environmental Defense Fund also petitioned
the Environmental Protection Agency to impose new limits on the planting of Bt crops. See Environmental
Defense Fund, EPA Asked to Limit Genetically Engineered Corn to Protect Butterflies (visited Jan. 28, 2000)
<http://www.edf.org/pubs/NewsReleases/1999/Jul/c_butternies.html>; The Environmental Defense Fund, Petition
(visited Jan. 28, 2000) <http://www.edf.org/issues/Btcompetition.html>.
53. Ruth Irwin, BuLterfly Brouhaha, ISB NEWS REP., July !999, at 2; see also Peter Kendall, Data Show
Corn Pollen Little Threat to Butterfly, CHI. TRIB., Nov. I 0, 1999, atE I.
54. Michael Fumento, The World Is Still Safe for Butterflies, WALL ST. J., June 25, 1999, at A 18 (quoting
John Losey of Cornell).
55. For a critique of several of the fears raised about the use ofrDNA techniques, see generally Miller, supra
note 39, at 197-203.
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United States and elsewhere, plants modified with rDNA techniques are subject to special
regulatory requirements.

B.

Domestic Regulation of Biotechnology

No federal regulatory statute explicitly targets agricultural biotechnology.
Nonetheless, genetically modified organisms are subject to regulation by three separate
agencies: the Department of Agriculture's Animal and Plant Health Inspection Service
(APHIS), the Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA). 56 Under all three programs, GMOs are regulated due to the method of their
production rather than to any inherent or likely risks from specific products or creations.
One reason for the regulation of GMOs is their apparent novelty. After the discovery
of DNA, advances in genetics occurred rapidly. The first successful transfer of genetic
material from one organism to another through DNA recombination occurred in 1973. 57
These experiments prompted broad speculation about the potential unknown risks of
biotechnology research. Some scientists were uncertain about the potential uses to which
these new techniques could be put and how the public would respond. These concerns
produced a voluntary moratorium on rDNA research in 1974. Two years later, the National
Institutes of Health's Recombinant DNA Advisory Committee issued guidelines for rDNA
research which were adopted, in tum, by all federal agencies sponsoring related research. 58
The National Institutes of Health (NIH) relaxed its guidelines in 1978 as it became
clear that the risks posed by rDNA techniques were overstated. In the words of one
commentator, the NIH recognized "the shallowness of the thought that had led to the early
restrictiveness." 59 Although the guidelines only applied to federally supported research,
most, if not all, private firms complied with the rules. The emerging biotech industry
sought regulatory certainty and was willing to accept government regulation of research
and development if it prevented more extreme regulatory responses down the road.
A potential turning point in federal regulation occurred in the early 1980s when
researchers at the University of California sought to field test bacteria-tbe ice-minus
bacteria-that were genetically modified to retard frost damage in plants. Because the
researchers received government research support, they applied for NIH approval of the
field tests. When the NIH approved the application in 1983 after nearly a year of review,
environmental activists sued, charging that the NIH violated the procedural requirements of
the National Environmental Policy Ad0 by failing to conduct an environmental impact
assessment of the test. 61 A federal court enjoined the test while the assessment was
prepared, and the Environmental Protection Agency announced that it would require
researchers to obtain experimental use permits for the field testing of any microbial agent
used as a pesticide or plant regulator. 62

56. Other agencies are involved in the regulation of biotechnology outside of the agricultural context. For
instance, the Occupational Health and Safety Administration (OSHA) regulates workplace safety as it relates to
biotechnology, and the National Institutes of Health and the National Science Foundation regulate biotechnology
research that is funded by federal tax dollars.
57. See NBPB REPORT, supra note 27, at E-2.
58. See id.
59. !d. at E-3 n.4.
60. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4347 (1999).
61. See Foundation on Econ. Trends v. Heckler, 587 F. Supp. 753, 755-56 (D.D.C. 1984), ajJ'd, 756 F.2d
143 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
62. See NBPB REPORT, supra note 27, at E-1 0, E-11.
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While the ice-minus tests finally occurred in 1987 (once the researchers obtained an
experimental use permit from the EPA), the resulting controversy had produced significant
federal regulation of genetically modified organisms. The FDA and the EPA established
procedures for the review of pharmaceuticals and pesticides, respectively, that were
produced with genetic engineering techniques. In July I 987, the APHIS also adopted
regulations covering the "introduction of organisms and products altered or produced
through genetic engineering which are plant pests or which there is reason to believe are
plant pests." 63 Thus, from the beginning, plants developed through rDNA techniques were
subject to precautionary regulation.
To this day, Congress has not authorized any specific measures to regulate
biotechnology. Regulation ofGMOs by the APHIS, FDA, and EPA is all based upon preexisting statutory authority. In each instance, federal regulators are looking to see whether
GMOs pose risks that these agencies are supposed to control. The APHIS, for instance,
requires permits or notifications when a company seeks to move or release a genetically
modified plant. Field tests of such plants, which the APHIS labels potential plant pests,
constitute releases under the agency's regulations, irrespective of the size of the test. 64
Plants that are deemed to pose a relatively minor risk of escape into the broader
environment can be released after a simpler notification procedure finalized by the APHIS
in I997. 65 Interestingly, there is no equivalent regulation of the introduction of species
modified by more "traditional" cross-breeding techniques.
Under section 402(a)(l) of the Federal Food and Drug Cosmetic Act (FDCA), 66 the
FDA is empowered to regulate "food additives," which are defined to include those
compounds produced with rDNA techniques that could become components of food.
Despite this authority, the FDA has not imposed additional regulatory burdens on
biotechnology products beyond consultation requirements. Beginning in I 992, the FDA
required companies to provide pre-market notification to the FDA of efforts to sell foods
derived from GMOs. The FDA will require the labeling of GMO-containing foods if there
is reason to believe that the introduced genes could act as allergens, or if the GMO-based
product has a nutritive value that is different from what consumers could reasonably
expect. 67
The EPA probably imposes the strictest regulations on GMOs of the three relevant
federal agencies.
Under the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
(FIFRA)/ 8 the EPA is authorized to regulate the use of pesticides and their concentrations
in foods. Under FIFRA, pesticides are defined to cover "any substance or mixture,"
including biological agents or organisms, "intended for preventing, destroying, repelling or
mitigating any pest, and ... intended for use as a plant regulator, defoliant, or desiccant. " 69
The EPA has interpreted this definition to include substances produced by plants that
enable crops to resist pests or disease and the genetic material used to create them. 70 Thus,
the EPA has the authority to regulate crops that are genetically engineered for greater pest
resistance and even plant hormones that regulate plant growth and maturation. At present,

63. 52 Fed. Reg. 22,892 ( 1987).
64. See Judith E. Beach, No ''Killer Toma10es ·:· Easing Federal Regulation of Genetically Engineered Plants,
53 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 181, 182-83 (1998 ).
65. See 62 Fed. Reg. 23,945 ( 1997); see also Beach, supra note 64, at 183.
66. 21 U.S.C. § 348(a) ( 1999).
67. See Beach, supra note 64, at 184-85.
68. 7 u.s.c. § 136 ( 1999).
69. /d. at§ 136(u).
70. See Beach, supra note 64, at 190.
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the EPA is finalizing new regulations of these so-called "plant-pesticides" that will tighten
testing and reporting requirements for genetically engineered plants. 71
Before any pesticide can be sold, it must be registered with the EPA. This process
requires the applicant to demonstrate, based on experimental data, that the pesticide in
question, when properly used, will not impose an unreasonable risk to public health or the
environment. Thus, applicants must typically conduct field tests of the pesticide, which
themselves require experimental use permits. 72 Once data on the proposed pesticide is
collected, it typically takes several additional years for the EPA to review the registration
application, particularly if the pesticide in question is not "substantially similar" to one that
is already registered. 73 Under FIFRA, the EPA is also authorized to grant "conditional
registrations" of new pesticides while awaiting the experimental data necessary for a final
decision on an application. Regulation of GMOs in the United States may be less stringent
than in some other countries, but it is still strict enough to impose a serious chilling effect
on biotechnology research and development. As the National Biotechnology Policy Board
concluded, "[f]ield testing of genetically engineered plants is much more expensive than
for other plants. " 74
C.

International Regulation of Biotechnology

Many environmental activists allege that ex1stmg domestic and international
regulation of biotechnology is insufficient to protect human health and the environment. In
particular, they wish to adopt precautionary measures and increase the stringency of
regulation of GMOs that cannot conclusively be demonstrated safe. Despite these efforts,
there is, as of yet, no international regulation of biotechnology. Most other industrialized
nations do regulate biotechnology, however, and there is pressure to tighten regulatory
requirements in Europe. In addition, international trade rules certainly impact the
development and sale of GMOs and GMO-derived products.
Europe and Japan currently regulate biotechnology more stringently than the United
States. Japan, for instance, has regulations that specifically focus on the process with
which foods and food additives are developed. The Japanese Ministry of Health and
Welfare has implemented a regulatory regime that applies special standards to genetically
modified products. 75 While Japan has a sizable biotechnology industry, at least for
fermentation products, these regulations are blamed for the low number of field trials of
genetically engineered plants in Japan. 76 Japan is also in the process of developing labeling
rules for biotech foods. In August 1999, Japan's Ministry of Agriculture, Forestry, and
Fisheries announced that, beginning in 2001, it will mandate labels on food products

71. See Proposed Policy; Plant-Pesticides Subject to the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act
and the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,496 (I 994); Plant-Pesticides Subject to the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act; Proposed Rule, 59 Fed. Reg. 60,519 ( 1994) (to be codified at 40
C.F.R. pts. 152, 174) (proposed Nov. 23, I994).
72. See Beach, supra note 64, at I 89.
73. See id. at I 89-90.
74. NBPB REPORT, supra note 27, at E-I9.
75. SeeMtLLER,supranote 16,at 162.
76. See id.
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containing or derived from GMOs. 77 Additional regulation of agricultural biotechnology is
also under consideration. 78
Regulations in the European Union (E.U.) are even more stringent and are still
evolving. 79 Germany's Genetic Technology Law, for example, requires the permission of
the Federal Health Authority for the introduction of any GMO. 80 The European Union as a
whole imposes strict regulatory standards on the use and introduction of GMOs and has
banned the use of certain genetically engineered products. 81 For instance, dairy farmers in
the European Union may not use recombinant bovine somatotropin, a growth hormone
used in many dairy farms in the United States. 82 E.U. directives regulate the contained use
of genetically modified microorganisms in laboratory research, 83 planting of genetically
modified crops and other "deliberate releases" into the environment, 84 the marketing and
sale of genetically modified products, 85 and the labeling of foods made from GMOs. 86
E.U. Directive 90/220 regulates the "deliberate release" of genetically modified
organisms, whether for field tests, agricultural production, or sale, as well as the marketing
of GMOs for that purpose. 87 The directive requires that all E.U. member nations "ensure
that all appropriate measures are taken to avoid adverse effects on human health and the
environment which might arise from the deliberate release or placing on the market of
GMOs." 88 In particular, a company or researcher seeking to "release" a GMO, such as a
genetically modified strain of com that is being field tested, must submit notification to the
relevant regulatory authority in the nation in which the release will occur. 89 This
notification must include, among other things, "a statement evaluating the impacts and risks
posed by the GMO(s) to human health or the environment from the uses envisaged." 90 The
national authority must then evaluate the notification and render a decision as to whether
the release will be allowed within ninety days. 91

77. See Panel OKs List of30 Food Products for GMO Labeling, JAPAN ECON. NEWSWIRE, Aug. I0, 1999,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Non-US News File; Irene Marushko, Japan to Proceed with GMO Labeling
(visited Jan. 13, 2000) <http://biz.yahoo.com/rf/990930/9k.htm>.
78. See Toshio Aritake, Japan Weighs Safety Guidelines for Production of GMO Crops, INT'L ENV'r. REP.,
Sept. I, 1999, at 719.
79. The "frequently changing" nature of European rules on biotechnology, particularly for the European
Union, generates substantial legal uncertainty which "significantly impacts U.S. agricultural producers seeking
access to the European market." Terence P. Stewart & DavidS. Johanson, Policy In Flux: The European Unions
Laws on Agricultural Biotechnology and Their Effects on International Trade, 4 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 243, 246-47
(1999).
80. See Graziano, supra note 3, at 181.
81. For a useful overview of E.U. biotech regulation, see generally Rod Hunter, European Regulation of
Genetically Modified Organisms, in FEARING FOOD: RISK, HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT (Julian Morris & Roger Bate
eds., 1999).
82. Interestingly enough, there is no limit on the importation of milk from cows that were treated with growth
hormones. This is probably because milk from hormone-fed cows is indistinguishable from other milk, and
therefore such an import restriction would be challenged under World Trade Organization rules.
83. See Council Directive 90/219, 1990 O.J. (L 117) I.
84. Council Directive 90/220, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 15.
85. See id.
86. See Council Regulation 258/97 Concerning Novel Foods and Novel Food Ingredients, art. I, 1997 O.J. (L
43) 2. Other E.U. regulations impacting biotechnology are the directives on biological agents at work (90/679) and
the transportation of"dangerous" goods (94/55).
87. The directive defines deliberate release as "any intentional introduction into the environment ... without
provisions for containment .... " Council Directive 90/220 on the Contained Use of Genetically Modified MicroOrganisms, Part A, art. 2, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 16.
88. /d. at Part A, art. 4; Council Directive 90/220, Part A, art. 4, 1990 O.J. (L 117) 17.
89. See id. at Part B, art. 5.
90. See id.
91. See id. at art. 6.
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Directive 90/220's notification and consent requirements for the marketing of GMOs
are more stringent. First, the GMO in question must either have been field tested in
compliance with the "deliberate release" provisions of the directive, or have undergone an
equivalent risk analysis. Second, once a notification has been submitted and accepted by
the relevant national authority, it is submitted to the European Commission for approval by
a qualified majority ofE.U. members. 92 Once approved by the European Union as a whole,
the product in question may be marketed throughout the European Union without any
additional notification requirements, provided that no member country objects. 93
Under Article 16 of Directive 90/220, any E.U. member country may "provisionally
restrict or prohibit" use or sale of a product if it has "justifiable reasons" that an approved
product poses "a risk to human health or the environment." 94 Then the European
Commission must again review the product in question and determine whether such
restrictions are justified and reach a decision within three months. 95 If the Commission
fails to make a decision, the proposal is forwarded to the E.U. Council of Ministers, which
votes on the proposal. 96 If the Council fails to vote on the proposal, the Commission will
adopt it. 97
This procedure has not worked well in practice. While many genetically modified
products have been approved for sale in the European Union, 98 individual nations have
nonetheless imposed bans on approved products under Article 16. France submitted a
proposal to allow the marketing of Ciba-Geigy's99 genetically modified maize in March
1995. 100 Despite the objections of several countries, the Commission approved the proposal
in January 1997, in large part due to concerns about international competitiveness and
favorable reports from the relevant E.U. scientific committees. 101 Within two months,
Austria and Luxembourg banned its sale within their territories, citing their authority to
"provisionally restrict" sale of an approved GMO if there are legitimate concerns that the
product could threaten human health or the environment. Austria and Luxembourg's
claims were reviewed by the scientific committees and found to be groundless. 102 As of
October 1999, the Commission had yet to issue a ruling to require that Austria and
Luxembourg allow the sale of the modified maize, and sale of the modified maize remained
illegal in two E.U. nations, despite its official approval by the European Union. 103
The European Union also requires the labeling of foods containing or derived from
GMOs under Directive 90/220 and the Novel Food Regulation. 104 In particular, companies
must provide labels that inform consumers of "any characteristic or food property such as

92. See id. at arts. I 2- I 3.
93. See id. at art. I 5.
94. See id. at art. I 6.
95. These procedures are laid out in article 2 I. See id. at art. 21.
96. See id.
97. See id.
98. See Hunter, supra note 81, at 213.
99. It is important to note that since the application was filed, Ciba-Geigy merged with Sandoz and adopted
the new corporate name of Novartis.
100. These events are summarized in Hunter, supra note 81, at 213-15 and in Stewart & Johanson, supra
note 79, at 260--68.
101. See Stewart & Johanson, supra note 79, at 262-63.
I 02. See id. at 266.
103. See Hunter, supra note 81, at 214. Austria also banned a modified maize engineered by Monsanto in
May 1999, but the E.U. scientific committees found no scientific basis for this action either. See EU
on
GM
Maize
(visited
Feb.
19,
2000)
Scientists
Reject
Austrian
Evidence
<http://LegalNews. find law .com/science/sf 19991 020/genesmaize.htm>.
104. See Regulation 258/97 1997 O.J. (L 43) I.
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composition, nutritional value or nutritional effects," including the fact that it is derived
from genetically modified organisms "which renders a novel food or food ingredient no
longer equivalent to an existing food or food ingredient." 105 In addition, companies must
label any foods that actually contain GMOs. 106 Products containing food ingredients that
may contain GMOs must also be labeled to this effect. 107 How broadly these requirements
will be interpreted is unclear, but it is worth noting that some E.U. member countries
believe that the labeling requirements do not only apply to manufacturers and distributors.
Indeed, some suggest that these rules could even require restaurants to disclose whether
dishes are made from foods derived from GMOs. 108
Most developing countries do not have biotechnology-specific regulation. However,
the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO) published a code of
conduct in 1992 to assist such countries with the development of regulatory standards and
infrastructure. 109 The UNIDO code, issued on behalf of the World Health Organization
(WHO), United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (F AO), and United Nations
Environment Programme (UNEP), outlines the "minimum acceptable" regulatory standards
that should govern the products of rDNA techniques. 110 The Code states that regulatory
evaluation of GMOs "should focus on the characteristics of the product rather than the
molecular or cellular techniques produce it." 111 Nonetheless, the Code also declares that
"[e]very member country should designate a national authority or authorities to be
responsible for handling enquiries and proposals, i.e., all contacts concerning the use and
introduction of GMOs," and calls for greater scrutiny of the introduction of GMOs than is
applied to the introduction of other organisms. 112
While there is no formal international regulation, there are two international
organizations that promulgate advisory sanitary (food safety) and phytosanitary (plant and
animal safety) measures relevant to the regulation of GMOs: the Codex Alimentarius
Commission (Codex) and the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC). 113 These
two entities address issues relating to human health and the protection of plant life,
respectively, and seek to facilitate the international harmonization of sanitary and
phytosanitary standards.
The Codex was created in 1962 by the United Nations Food and Agricultural
Organization and the World Health Organization. 114 It was created "to guide and promote
the elaboration and establishment of definitions and requirements for foods, to assist in
I 05. See id. at art. 8( I )(a). As this provision is interpreted, it also requires labeling when the fact that a
product was derived from GMOs could have health implications for consumers, such as potential allergic
reactions, or could raise ethical concerns. See Hunter, supra note 81, at 223.
I 06. See id. at art. 8( I )(d).
I 07. Some ingredients are shipped in bulk. Because GM and non-GM products are rarely separated at this
stage, it is likely that many foods contain both GM and non-GM ingredients.
I 08. See Hunter, supra note 81, at 224.
I 09. See United Nations Industrial Development Organization, Voluntwy Code of Conduct for the Release
of Organisms into the Environment (visited Feb. I, 2000) <http://binas.unido.org/binas/Regulations/
unido/codes.shtml>.
II 0. See id. § 1-C.
Ill. See id. § 11-C-la.
112. See id. § II-C-2a. The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety similarly requires signatories to establish
regulatory regimes covering biotechnology. See Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on
opened for signature May
15-26,
2000,
(visited
Feb.
23,
2000)
Biological
Diversity,
<hnp://www.biodiv.org/biosafe/BIOSAFETY-PROTOCOL.htm> (hereinafter CPB].
113. A third related organization, the International Office of Epizootics (IOE), promulgates standards relating
to animal health, but has yet to be involved in the debate over the regulation of GMOs. See Redick et a!., supra
note 40, at 23.
114. See Terence P. Stewart & DavidS. Johanson, The SPS Agreement of the World Trade Organization and
fnternational Organizations, 26 SYR. J. INT'L L. & COM. 27,41 (1998).
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their harmonization and, in doing so, to facilitate international trade." 115 Today there are
162 member countries of the Codex, which has issued 200 food commodity standards, 40
hygiene codes, 700 evaluations of various food additives, and over 3200 pesticide residue
standards. 116 As this paper is being written, the Codex is creating a working group to
evaluate proposals to require the labeling of foods derived from GMOs. 117
The IPPC was created in 1951 to "secure common and effective action to prevent the
spread and introduction of pests and plants and plant products and to promote measures for
their control." 118 Thus, the IPPC helps to coordinate regional and international quarantines
and sets voluntary standards on pathogens and potential plant pests. 119 Despite pressure
from environmental NGOs, the IPPC has not found any scientific justification, as of yet, for
the development of GMO-specific standards. 120
International trade rules limit the extent to which individual nations can regulate the
importation of GMOs or GMO-derived products. Under Article XX of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), nations are authorized to enact measures
"relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources" or "necessary to protect
human, animal or plant life or health." 121 Such measures cannot be "a disguised restriction
on international trade" or "applied in a manner which would constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination. " 122 In practice, this means that environmental measures
must be scientifically based and no more trade restrictive than necessary to meet their
goals. 123 These rules are enforced through the World Trade Organization (WTO), the
successor organization to the GATT.
In practice, nations can regulate the importation of goods based on their actual
characteristics, but not the manner in which they were produced. Thus, a country can limit
the importation of a plant or animal species that would be a potential pest if introduced or
bar the importation of a food product that does nol meet that nation's food safety
requirements. A country may not, however, limit the importation of a plant or product
simply because it was genetically engineered.
Additionally, if an otherwise legitimate import restriction is not based upon solid
science, such as the European ban on beef from hormone-fed cattle discussed below, 124 it
will be ruled invalid by the WT0. 125 This requirement limits the ability of governments to
enact protectionist trade measures under the guise. of environmental protection. In

115. Stewart & Johanson, supra note 114, at 41 (quoting CODEX ALIMNETARIUS COMMISSION, THIS IS
CODEX ALIMENTARIUS 2 (2d ed.)).
116. See Redick et al., supra note 40, at 22.
117. See Sticky Labels, ECONOMIST, May I, 1999, at 75.
118. See Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations, Conference, 29th Session, Revision of
the International Plant Protection Convention, C 97117, at I (Nov. 18, 1997), quoted in Stewart & Johanson, supra
note 114, at 46.
I 19. See Redick et al., supra note 40, at 23.
120. See id.
121. See General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 194 7, art. XX(b ), (g), in INTEREST GROUP ON
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, AMERICAN SOCIETY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, BASIC DOCUMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW ( 1990) [hereinafter GATT].
122. See id. at art. XX.
123. See, e.g., James M. Sheehan, The Greening of Trade Policy: "Sustainable Development" and Global
Trade, ENVIRONMENTAL STUDIES PROGRAM (Competitive Enterprise Institute, Wash., D.C.) Nov. 1994, at 29
(discussing interpretation of GATT Article XX by dispute resolution panels).
124. See discussion infra Part IV.BJ.
125. Of course, it is important to remember that countries cannot be forced to remove GA TT-illegal trade
restrictions. Rather, if a regulation is declared inconsistent with GATT rules, affected countries are authorized to
enact retaliatory trade sanctions.
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determining whether a given restriction is scientifically based, the WTO looks to existing
scientific research and the relevant standards set by Codex, the IPPC, and other relevant
international standards. Cases in which GATT arbitration panels have upheld traderestrictive environmental measures are few and far between, though this could change with
the enactment of a biosafety protocol.

Ill.

THE BIOSAFETY PROTOCOL

Biotechnology's freedom from international regulation may not last long. For several
years, environmentalist organizations, including the Union of Concerned Scientists,
National Wildlife Federation, and the Center for International Environmental Law, called
for the adoption of an international treaty to establish regulatory controls and liability rules
for bioengineered products. 126 In 1999 and 2000, parties to the United Nations Convention
on Biological Diversity met in Cartagena, Columbia and Montreal, Canada to formulate
just such an agreement. In the wee hours of January 29, 2000, negotiators approved the
text of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety. 127 If this protocol is adopted, it could have a
profound effect on the future of biotechnology and international trade in agricultural
products.

A.

The United Nations Convention on Biological Diversity

The biosafety protocol was negotiated under the auspices of the United Nations
Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). 128 The CBD, signed at the 1992 United
Nations Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, has three stated objectives: (!)"the conservation
of biological diversity," (2) "the sustainable use of its components," and (3) "the fair and
equitable sharing of the benefits arising out of the utilization of genetic resources." 129 The
CBD obligates parties to develop "national strategies, plans or programs" for the
conservation of biodiversity, 130 which shall include, among other things, (a) "a system of
protected areas," such as parks or reserves, that include protective buffer zones and are to
be managed to ensure "conservation and sustainable use"; 131 (b) "measures for the recovery
and rehabilitation of threatened species," including the reintroduction of species into their
native range; 132 and (c) measures to "facilitate access to genetic resources for
environmentally sound uses" 133 and the transfer of advanced technologies to other
nations. 134
Like many environmental treaties, the CBD explicitly endorses a precautionary
approach to the protection of biodiversity. The preamble to the Convention states "where
there is a threat of significant reduction or loss of biological diversity, lack offull scientific
certainty should not be used as a reason for postponing measures to avoid or minimize

126. See Graziano, supra note 3, at 199 (citing NGO Call for a Legally Binding Protocol on Biosafety,
opened for signature Dec. I0, 1994).
127. Report of the Resumed Session of the Extraordinary Meeting of the Conference of the Parties for the
Adoption of the Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity: 24-28 January 2000, EARTH
NEGOTIATIONS BULL., Jan. 31, 2000, at 4--5 [hereinafter Report of Resumed Session].
128. See CBD, supra note 9.
129. See id. at art. I.
130. See id. at art. 6.
131. See id. at art. 8.
132. See id. at art. 9.
133. See id. at art. 15.
134. See id. at art. 16.
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such a threat." 135 In this regard, the CBD echoes Agenda 21, the Rio Declaration, and
other international calls for adoption of the precautionary principle in environmental
policy. 136
The CBD requires parties "as far as possible and as appropriate" to "prevent the
introduction of, control or eradicate those alien species which threaten ecosystems, habitats
or species." 137 In addition, parties to the Convention must:
establish or maintain means to regulate, manage or control the risks associated
with the use and release of living modified organisms resulting from
biotechnology which are likely to have adverse environmental impacts that
could affect the conservation and sustainable use of biological diversity, taking
also into account the risks to human health. 138
This language from Article 8(g) is sufficiently broad and tentative to justify almost any
level ofbiotechnology regulation.
The Convention specifically provides for the negotiation and adoption of an
international biosafety protocol. Under Article 19, the parties to the CBD are to "consider
the need for and modalities of a protocol" regulating "the safe transfer, handling and use of
any living modified organism resulting from biotechnology that may have an adverse
effect" on biological diversity. 139 In particular, a biosafety protocol under the CBD is to
determine when "advance informed agreement" is necessary before genetically engineered
organisms or GMO-derived products are imported to one country from another. 140 The
procedures for adopting and amending protocols to the CBD are laid out in Articles 23, 28,
and 29.
On December 29, 1993, the treaty went into effect after ratification by thirty
nations. 141 Today, there are 176 parties to the CBD, but the United States is not among
them. 142 While President Bush refused to sign the Convention, President Clinton signed it
on June 4, 1993. The U.S. Senate, however, has yet to consider CBD ratification. Until the
Convention is ratified, the United States is not bound by its terms, nor may it participate as
more than an observer at Conference of the Parties (COP) meetings. 143

B.

Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety

While the CBD provides for the negotiation of a biosafety protocol, no such protocol
is specifically required by the convention. Thus, the Clinton Administration proclaimed in
November 1993 that "the United States does not believe that a protocol on biosafety under
135. See id. at preamble (emphasis added).
I 3 6. See discussion infra Part IV.
137. See CBD, supra note 9, at art. 8(h).
138. See id. at art. 8(g) (emphasis added).
139. See id. at art. 19 §3. Note that the protocol focuses on "living modified organisms" or "LMOs," a subset
of GMOs capable of replicating or transferring their genetic material. LMOs include seeds, sterile organisms and
viruses. See CPB, supra note 112, at art. 3.
140. See CPB, supra note 112, at art. 3.
141. See David R. Purnell, International Implications of New Agricultural Biotechnology, 25 U. MEM. L.
REv. 1189, 1202-03 (1995). Under Article 36, the CBD enters into force on the nineteenth day after ratification
by 30 signatory nations. See CBD, supra note 9, at art. 36.
I42. Report of the Resumed Session, supra note 127, at I.
143. Of course, given U.S. influence in world affairs, U.S. policy positions have a substantial impact on COP
negotiations despite the official observer status.
.
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this Convention is warranted." 144 Similar skepticism about the need for a protocol was
expressed by a scientific panel convened by UNEP in 1993 to consider issues relating to a
protocol. According to the panel's report, "a protocol would, for no clear purpose: (i)
divert scientific and administrative resources from higher priority needs; and (ii) delay the
diffusion of techniques beneficial to biological diversity, and essential to the progress of
human health and sustainable agriculture." 145
Nonetheless, many nations and
environmentalist groups insist that a protocol is required to safeguard human health and the
environment. Once the CBD entered into force at the end of 1993, negotiations on a
biosafety protocol began, starting with the first Conference of the Parties (COP) meeting in
1994. 146
As noted above, under the CBD, "biotechnology" is defined as "any technological
application that uses biological systems, living organisms, or derivatives thereof, to make
or modify products or processes for specific use." 147 Despite this broad definition, which
encompasses various hybridization techniques going back centuries, U.N. officials
determined early on that a biosafety protocol would focus solely on "organisms in which
the genetic material has been altered in a way that does not occur naturally by mating
and/or natural recombination." 148 Specifically, the UNEP panel sought to exclude
"organisms modified by traditional breeding methods" from regulation under a proposed
protocol. 149
Under this approach, "phenotypically identical organisms (that is, those exhibiting the
same characteristics) could be subject to drastically different regulatory requirements,
depending solely on the method of genetic modification used on them." 150 In other words,
the level to which an organism would be regulated under the protocol is more a function of
how it is produced than of the actual risks it poses to human health or the environment.
The irrationality of this approach is that biologically invasive species, such as kudzu, could
be field tested without regulation, yet an innocuous, but nonetheless bioengineered, tomato
or strawberry would be subject to the protocol's regulatory restrictions. 151 Such an
approach has no sound scientific basis and is, instead grounded on an inordinate fear of
new technological innovations.
The second COP meeting, in November 1995, established the Open-ended Ad hoc
Working Group on Biosafety (BSWG) chartered to "elaborate, as a priority, the modalities
and elements of a protocol," including key definitions, categories of GMOs, procedures for
advance informed agreement, and the incorporation of the precautionary principle. 152 From
the beginning, there was substantial agreement that a protocol should cover all potential
uses of GMOs that could impact biodiversity, including releases into the environment, the

144. Letter from the U.S. Department of State conveying the CBD to President Clinton, which was in tum
submitted to the U.S. Senate, quoted in Henry I. Miller, Is the Biodiversity Treaty a Bureaucratic Time Bomb?
ESSAYS IN PUB. POLY No. 56, 3 (Hoover Institution, 1995) [hereinafter Bureaucratic Time Bomb].
145. UNEP, Report of Panel IV: Consideration of the Need for Modalities of Protocol Selling out
Appropriate Procedures Including, in Particular, Advance Informed Agreements in the Field of the Safe Transfer,
Handling and Use of Any Living Modified Organism Resulting from Biotechnology Diversity, UNEP Arguments
for a Protocol Pursuant to Article 19.3 of the Convention,~ 42(ii), at II, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div/Panels/lnt.4
( 1993), quoted in Redick et al., supra note 40, at 37.
146. See Redick et al., supra note 40, at 38.
147. See CBD, supra note 9, at art. 2.
148. Expert Panels Established to Follow Up on the Convention on Biological Diversity, Report of Panel IV,
Apr. 28, !993, U.N. Doc. UNEP/Bio.Div/Panels/lnf., quoted in Miller, supra note 144, at 5.
149. See id.
150. Miller, supra note 144, at 4.
151. See id. at 6.
152. See Summary of the First Meeting of the Open-Ended Ad Hoc Working Group on Biosafety, EARTH
NEGOTIATIONS BULL., July 29, 1996, at 2.
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transboundary movement of GMOs, whether due to international trade or migration, and
information exchange on biotechnology. This was about the limit of the consensus,
however, even without the United States' formal participation.
When the BSWG first met in July I 996, there was substantial disagreement among
the participating countries, particularly in the developing world. Latin American nations
with significant agricultural exports disagreed with other developing countries on the extent
to which GMOs should be regulated. These nations see biotechnology as a key to their
economic development, while African nations, few of which have any biotechnology
development at all within their borders, see biotechnology more as a threat. 153 During the
first BSWG meeting, approximately forty non-governmental organizations-ranging from
the Center for International Environmental Law, Greenpeace International, and Friends of
the Earth, to the Indigenous Peoples' Biodiversity Network, Institute for Agriculture and
Trade Policy, and the Third World Network-called for an international moratorium on the
use, development, handling, or transfer of all GMOs until an international biosafety
protocol is negotiated and in place, lest there be a "<;atastrophic release" of GMOs. 154 This,
despite the fact that to date an estimated 28 million hectares around the world have been
planted with rDNA-engineered crops without significant incident. 155
At the next several BSWG meetings, delegates sought to hammer out a draft protocol
proposal and established a timetable for finalizing protocol negotiations at the February
1999 COP meeting in Cartagena, Columbia, but it was not to be. 156 Participating nations
had substantial disagreement over liability for harms from GMOs, whether the protocol
would conform to WTO rules and advance informed agreement procedures, and whether
such procedures would apply to products derived from GMOs, such as textiles made from
genetically engineered cotton or breakfast cereal made from genetically engineered com. 157
In addition to the United States, which could only participate as an observer, Argentina,
Australia, Canada, Chile, and Uruguay also opposed a stringent protocol, fearing the impact
ofbiosafety regulations on their agriculture exports. 158
One of the thorniest sticking points was the scope of advance informed agreement
procedures required prior to the first import of any living GMO intended for release into
the environment. 159 In the negotiating draft of the protocol, the exporting party would have
to notifY the country in writing of the intended import. The importer would have ninety
days to acknowledge receipt of the notification and 270 days to decide whether the import
will be allowed. 160 In deciding whether to allow the import, a member _country could
consider scientific, environmental, and even socio-economic considerations under Article

See id. at 9.
See Graziano, supra note 3, at 199 (citing NGO Call 'for a Legally Binding Protocol on Biosafety,
opened for signalure Dec. 10, 1994).
155. See Philip]_ Abelson & Pamela J. Hines, The Plan/ Revolulion, 285 SCIENCE 367,367 (1999).
153.
154.

156. Technically, U.N.Iingo defines the February Cartagena meeting as an "Extraordinary Conference of the
Parties" or "Ex COP" as opposed to a traditional COP meeting.
157. See Andrew Pollack, Biolechnology Trealy Sialls as U.S. and Developing Nalions Quarrel, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 23, 1999, at All.
158. See id.
159. The draft excludes pharmaceuticals and LMOs that are intended for testing in contained facilities.
160. See Report of the Sixth Session of the Open-Ended Ad Hoc Working Group on Biosafety and lhe First
Exlraordinary Session ofihe CBD Conference of the Parlies, EARTH NEGOTIATIONS BULL., Feb. 26, 1999, at 5
[hereinafter Report of the Sixlh Session]. The importing country would not actually have to make a decision within
the 270-day window, as the draft protocol would allow the country to ask for additional information about the
GMO in question or even extend the decision period by "a defined period of time." See id.
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24 of the draft, though the delegations from developed countries sought to have this
provision eliminated. 161
The argument for requiring advance informed agreement of living organisms is that
national governments have a right to know what is coming across their borders and should
have the opportunity to ensure that the importation of new plant or animal species will not
cause ecological harm. As noted above, non-genetically modified exotic species have
caused substantial ecological disruptions around the globe, often due to inadvertent
introduction. But this would be an argument for rules regulating the importation of all
living organisms through existing quarantine rules and the like, irrespective of how they
were developed. As a scientific matter, the question would be whether a particular seed or
organism posed an ecological threat due to its particular characteristics, not whether it was
manipulated with rDNA techniques. The scientific case for including advance informed
agreement for GMO-derived products, as some developing countries demanded, is even
more questionable, as such goods do not pose a unique environmental threat, if they pose a
threat at all. 162 Such a rule would empower a country to deny importation of a new wheat
strain or even, under some proposals, Levi's blue jeans made from genetically modified
cotton, something that could not be defended on environmental grounds. This suggests that
at least some advocates of such limits are motivated by factors other than protecting public
health ~nd ecological integrity, such as impeding market development for GMO-derived
products, in the case of environmentalists, and increasing opportunities to use
environmental rules as a cover for trade protectionism, for some developing countries.
A requirement for advance informed consent for each and every shipment of GMOs,
such as crop seeds and GMO-derived products, would directly conflict with international
trade rules. Article 31 of the draft protocol stated that nothing in the agreement affects the
rights and obligations that member nations have under other agreements, "except where
exercise of those rights and obligations would cause serious damage or threat to
biodiversity." 163 As noted above, the WTO does not allow countries to impose import
restrictions on products based on the manner in which they were made, and grain exporting
countries, including the United States and many Latin American countries, refused to adopt
a protocol that violates this principle. 164 Developing nations, the European Union, and
environmental organizations, however, seek a protocol that creates an exception to WTO
rules.
The February 1999 meeting in Cartagena ended without agreement on a biosafety
protocol. "Biotechnology can contribute enormously to human well-being, but it poses
potential risks," commented UNEP Executive Director Klaus Toepfer at the close of the
Cartagena meeting. "For this reason, the global community will continue to work on
establishing a legally binding biosafety regime." 165 Intent on developing a binding
international instrument, negotiators met again during 1999 and convened for a final formal
negotiating session in January 2000 in Montreal.
Negotiations in Montreal were more successful than prior rounds and protocol
language was finally agreed upon.
While environmental activists engaged in
demonstrations and street theater outside, negotiators hammered out a compromise

161. See id. at 8.
162. Some developing country delegates argued that any living GMO could be potentially released into the
environment, and therefore all living GMOs should be covered by advance informed agreement procedures. See
id. at 5.
163. See id. at 8.
164. See Ehsan Masood, Collapse of Talks on Safety ofGMO Trade, 398 NATURE 6, 6 (1999).
165. UNEP, Governments Postpone Adoption of Biosafety Treaty (visited Jan. 28, 2000)
<http://www.biodiv.org/press/pr2-99-BSWG6.html>.
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protocol. 166 While less restnctive than some nations wanted, the protocol explicitly
embraces the precautionary principle in its operative provisions and will empower nations
to restrict imports of genetically modified products. The protocol will be open for
signature beginning in May 2000.
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety provides for advance informed agreement for
the importation of "living modified organisms" (LMOs) that will be planted as crops or
otherwise intended for deliberate release into the environment. These provisions apply to
the first time a given LMO is imported into a country that is a party to the protocol. 167
Once notice of a transboundary shipment is given, the importing nation is to respond within
ninety days, indicating whether the shipment may proceed or whether additional
information is required. 168 This provision will be difficult to enforce, however, as failure to
respond does "not imply ... consent" to the shipment. 169
LMOs that are to be used for food, feed, or processing are exempt from the advance
informed agreement provisions, but bulk shipments must be labeled. 170 Such shipments
must indicate that they "may contain" LMOs. 171 The protocol's language also implies that
developing nations that lack a "domestic regulatory framework" for biotechnology may
reject for any reason importation of LMOs to be used for food, feed, or for processing. 172
The protocol also provides for the creation of a Biosafety Clearing-House to which member
nations must provide information about approved LMOs, transboundary shipments, and the
like. 173
The protocol explicitly embraces the precautionary principle at several points. The
preamble states that parties "[r]eaffirm[] the precautionary approach" to environmental
protection. 174 In addition, Articles I 0 and 11 of the protocol explicitly state that "lack of
scientific certainty" shall not prevent countries from barring importation of LMOs. 175
Parties to the protocol are also permitted to take "socio-economic considerations" into
account when deciding whether or not to allow the importation of an LM0. 176 These
provisions may permit member nations to block importation due to unfounded
environmental scares or special interest pressure. 177
The protocol negotiations did not settle every issue. The United States and other
exporting countries sought to ensure that the protocol would not conflict with international
trade rules under the WTO. The European Union and some developing countries, on the
other hand, sought a protocol that would not be so limited. The protocol's final language
on this point is deliberately vague and inconclusive. The preamble both "emphasiz[es]"
that the protocol does not alter the rights and obligations of parties under other international
agreements and "understands" that this does not mean that the protocol is "subordinate" to

166. See, e.g., David Sanger, Protesters March Through Montreal, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Jan. 22, 2000; see
also Andrew Pollack, 130 Nations Agree on Safety Rules for Biotech Food, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2000, at A l.
!67. See CPB,supra note 112, at art. 7.
168. See id. at arts. 9-1 0.
169. See id. at art. 9( 4 ).
170. Under Article 5, pharmaceuticals are also exempt from the protocol's advance informed agreement
provisions and need not be labeled.
17!. See CPB, supra note 112. at art. 18(2)(a).
172. See id. at art. 11(6).
173. See id. at art. 20.
174. See id. at preamble.
175. See id. at arts. I 0(6), 11 (8).
176. See id. at art. 26(1).
177. See discussion infra Part IV.B.
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other agreements. 178 Other issues, such as potential liability for any harm caused by the
introduction of genetically engineered organisms, will be resolved at a later date. 179

IV.

THE PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE & ITS PERILS

Calls to regulate GMOs and the other products of rDNA techniques until the
uncertainty about their potential risks is reduced, if not eliminated, are all variants of the
precautionary principle, the idea that new technologies and substances should be regulated
before they can cause harm rather than after their harmful potential has been demonstrated.
A typical version of the precautionary principle can be found in the Wingspread Consensus
Statement, a document drafted and endorsed by a group of environmental activists and
scholars. According to the statement, the precautionary principle holds that "[w]hen an
activity raises threats of harm to human health or the environment, precautionary measures
should be taken even if some cause and effect relationships are not fully established
scientifically." 180 In other words, regulate first, assess the risks later. As applied in the
environmental context, this means that it is better to err on the side of regulating or
controlling new technologies than to risk new or unforeseen problems. In the ideal, new
technologies should be proven "safe" before they are used. 181
The precautionary principle has become a staple of international environmental law.
The Rio Declaration, agreed to at the 1992 U.N. Earth Summit, declares that "[w]here there
are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty shall not be
used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent environmental
degradation," and that "[i]n order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach
shall be widely applied by States according to their capabilities." 182 Similar precautionary
statements can be found in other environmental treaties, including the Vienna Convention
for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, 183 the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change, 184 and the Convention on Biological Diversity, among others. 185 The
European Union has also embraced reliance on the precautionary principle in the fields of
environmental protection and human, animal and plant health. 186
Yet while the
178. See CPB, supra note 1\2, at preamble.
179. See id. at art. 27.
180. The Precautionary Principle, RACHEL'S ENV'T & HEALTH WKLY, (Feb.
19,
\998)
<http://www. rachel.org/searchlindex.cfm?st= I>.
Signatories of the statement included representatives of
Greenpeace, Physicians for Social Responsibility, the W. Alton Jones Foundation, the Silicon Valley Toxics
Coalition, and the Indigenous Environmental Network, among others. See id. Other statements of the
precautionary principle are essentially the same. See. e.g., Gregory D. Fullem, Comment, The Precautionary
Principle: Environmental Protection in the Face of Uncertainty, 31 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 495, 497-98 ( \995)
("The principle asserts that regulators and decision makers should act in anticipation of environmental harm,
without regard to the certainty of the scientific information pertaining to the risk of harm."); Brian Wynee & Sue
Mayer, How Science Fails the Environment, NEW SCIENTIST, June 5, 1993, at 32, 34 ("precautionary principle
demands that the environment must not be left to show harm before action is taken").
181. Of course, proving that a new technology or product will cause no harm would require proving a
negative, something that science cannot do. In this sense, the precautionary principle establishes a default rule for
regulating new innovations irrespective of the relative risk that they actually pose to human health or the
environment.
182. Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, U.N. Conference on Environment and
Development, Agenda Item 21, at 10, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.\51/5/Rev.\ (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 876, 879,
principle I 5 ( 1992).
183. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, Mar. 22, 1985, 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1985).
184. United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, 31 I.L.M. (1992).
\85. Until the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, however, precautionary statements were not incorporated
into operative treaty provisions.
186. Commission of the European Communities, COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION ON THE
PRECAUTIONARY PRINCIPLE, Feb. 2, 2000, at 30.
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The Perils ofPrecaution

The precautionary principle appeals to the common sense idea that "it is better to be
safe than sorry." In practice, the precautionary principle biases regulatory decisions against
the introduction of any new technology. 187 While those who advocate adoption of the
precautionary principle purport to be acting in defense of public health and the
environment, the precautionary principle may well leave us more sorry and less safe. As
noted by the late Aaron Wildavsky, "The empirical question is whether the health [and
environmental] gains from the regulation of the substances involved are greater or lesser
than the health [and environmental] costs of the regulation." 188
In the case of
biotechnology, unduly restricting the development of GMOs in agriculture could have
substantial negative impact on human health and the environment, making it unclear
whether adoption of the precautionary principle would make us safer at all.
The problem is that by focusing on one set of risks-those posed by the introduction
of new technologies with somewhat uncertain effects-the precautionary principle turns a
blind eye to the harms that occur, or are made worse, due to the lack of technological
development. "The truly fatal flaw of the precautionary principle, ignored by almost all the
commentators, is the unsupported presumption that an action aimed at public health
protection cannot possibly have negative effects on public health." 189 The unfortunate
reality is that efforts to regulate one risk can create other, often more dangerous risks. As
Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer noted in his book Breaking the Vicious Circle, "One
can find many examples of regulators' ignoring one program's safety or environmental
effects upon another .... " 190 Other commentators have noted that "when agencies regulate
a particular substance or technology, they often fail to consider the secondary impacts of
regulation, such as the risks presented by substitute products or activities." 191
Perhaps the most prominent example of the harm caused by excessive "precaution" in
regulatory policy is FDA-induced "drug lag."
The FDA must approve new
pharmaceuticals and medical devices before they may be used or prescribed in the United
States. The purpose of FDA approval is to ensure that only those drugs deemed "safe and
effective" are approved for use. In a precautionary fashion, the FDA seeks to prevent the
release of an unsafe drug. Delaying the availability of potentially life-saving treatment,
however, poses risks of its own. 192 Consider the question posed by one prominent FDA
critic: "If a drug that has just been approved by FDA will start saving lives tomorrow, then
how many people died yesterday waiting for the agency to act?" 193

187. See Smen Holm & John Harris, Precautionary Principle Stifles Discovery, 400 NATURE 398, 398
( 1999) ("The [precautionary principle] will block the development of any technology if there is the slightest
theoretical possibility ofharm.").
188. AARON WILDAVSKY, BUT IS IT TRUE? 428 ( 1995).
189. Cross, supra note 43, at 860.
190. STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION 22 ( 1993).
191. Edward W. Warren and Gary E. Merchant, "More Good Than Harm·:· A First Principle for
Environmental Agencies and Reviewing Courts, 20 ECOLOGY L.Q. 379, 390 ( 1993 ).
192. See, e.g., Sam Kazman, Deadly Overcaution: FDA s Dmg Approval Process, I J. REG. & Soc. COSTS
35 (1990).
193. !d. at 35.
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A good example is the approval of Misoprostol, a drug that prevents gastric ulcers. 194
The FDA approved Misoprostol in December 1988. At the time, Misoprostol was already
approved in several dozen foreign countries. The drug had been available in some nations
as early as 1985. Nonetheless, the FDA subjected Misoprostol to a nine-and-one-half
month review after clinical trials for safety and efficacy had been completed. Given
Misoprostol's high rate of effectiveness, and the fact that gastric ulcers claimed between
10,000 and 20,000 lives at the time of its approval, as many as 8000 to 15,000 lives could
have been saved if Misoprostol had been approved more quickly. In other words, the
FDA's delay-even of only several months (short by FDA approval standards)-costs
lives, just as surely as does the approval and use of unsafe treatments. 195 Thus, the FDA's
application of the precautionary principle does not necessarily make people safer.
Cases in which efforts to address one risk or environmental problem have perverse,
even anti-environmental, consequences are all too common. Consider just a few examples.
Ethylene dibromide (EDB) was a powerful fungicide used to prevent the growth of
molds on grain and other foods. Molds produce some of the most potent carcinogens found
in nature, such as aflatoxin. Yet EDB was also deemed a potential carcinogen and was
banned by the EPA without any consideration of whether the risk of EDB was greater or
lesser than that posed by aflatoxin. Moreover, EDB was replaced with fungicides that had
to be applied in greater quantities, increasing the risk for exposed workers. 196 Thus, the
EDB ban may have, in net, increased risks to human health.
In 1994, the EPA enacted changes to the reformulated gasoline program under the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990. The changes were designed to increase the use of
"renewable" fuel sources by mandating that a minimum percentage of oxygen-enhancing
fuel additives for reformulated gasoline come from ethanol or ethanol-derived sources.
This rule would have done nothing to improve environmental quality. Indeed, the EPA
"even conceded that use of ethanol might possibly make air quality worse." 197 The EPA's
narrow focus on one type of air pollution risked increasing another.
In 1996, the EPA proposed to tighten the National Ambient Air Quality Standard for
ozone. Yet in its zealous pursuit of lower tropospheric ozone levels, the EPA ignored some
of the public health impacts that significant reductions could cause. 198 In particular, the
EPA ignored data suggesting that reducing ground-level ozone could increase human
exposure to ultraviolet-B radiation, and consequently increase skin cancer rates. According
to one study, "a 'health optimal' [ozone standard] might differ significantly from a
[standard] set without consideration of UY-B-related deaths and disease, and it could even
be less stringent than the current [ozone standard]." 199
The ill effects of undue precaution can be even broader as "at all times regulation
imposes costs that mean less real income available to individuals for alternative
expenditure ... [which] itself has adverse health effects, in the form of poorer diet, more
heart attacks, more suicides." 200 Insofar as regulations divert resources away from
194. This discussion is based on the Kazman article. See id. at 47-48.
195. For a fuller discussion of drug lag, see generally H.G. GRABOWSKI & J. M. VERNON, THE REGULATION
OF PHARMACEUTICALS ( [ 983); SAM PELTZMAN, REGULATION OF PHARMACEUTICAL [NNOV ATION ( [ 974 ).
196. See Cross, supra note 43, at 875-76.
197. 59 Fed. Reg. 39,268 (1994), cited in American Petroleum lnst. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency 52 F.3d
1113, 1119 (1995) (invalidating EPA reformulated gasoline regulations due to lack of statutory authority).
198. See American Trucking Ass'ns, Inc. v. U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, 175 F.3d 1027, 1051 (D.C. Cir.
1999). The U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the EPA's refusal to consider the
radiation-blocking potential of tropospheric ozone violated the Clean Air Act. See id. at I 051-53.
199. See Randall Lutter & Christopher Wolz, UV-8 Screening by Tropospheric Ozone: Implications for the
National Ambient Air Quality Standard, 31 ENVTL. SCIENCE & TECH. 142A, 145A (1997).
200. See BREYER, supra note l 90, at 23.
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potentially life-saving or safety-enhancing activities, they make people worse off. At the
extreme, regulations that impose substantial costs can even increase overall mortality. 201
Higher economic growth and aggregate wealth strongly correlate with reduced mortality
and morbidity. 202 This should be no surprise as the accumulation of wealth is necessary to
fund medical research, support markets for advanced life-saving technologies, build
infrastructure necessary for better food distribution, and so on. In a phrase, poorer is
sicker, and wealthier is healthier. 203 "There is no free health. " 204 Much the same can be
said for environmental protection. 205

B.

The Perils of a Protocol

Like any precautionary measure, a Biosafety Protocol will entail costs. These costs
will not only be financial. "Unnecessary governmental scrutiny in the form of case-by-case
reviews will cause delays in the testing of biotechnological products, increase the potential
for corruption and markedly inhibit the diffusion of this useful technology to the
developing world." 206 Reducing the development and diffusion of biotechnology will, in
tum, limit the environmental and social benefits that GMOs could provide. 207
Some advocates of a highly precautionary biosafety protocol recognize that "[m]aking
disease-resistant and immune crops is a necessity for future generations, whose increasing
populations will require increased agricultural output." 208 Yet there does not seem to be
much recognition that a "strong" biosafety protocol could retard increases in agricultural
productivity, thereby increasing the risks of global food shortages and habitat loss. Indeed,
there is a reason to believe that a highly regulatory biosafety protocol, or even one that
sanctions greater regulations by member countries, could make it increasingly difficult to
meet the food demands of a growing world population and undermine the stated goals of
the Convention on Biological Diversity by increasing rates of habitat destruction. Given
that the risk of famine and loss of biodiversity are most acute in the developing world, "the
support of many developing companies for a restrictive protocol is perplexing." 209 But
perhaps it is explained by the third threat posed by a precautionary treaty: the use of
protocol-authorized restrictions on trade in GMOs for economic rent-seeking.

20 I. See generally Frank B. Cross, When Environmental Regulations Kill, 22 ECOLOGY L.Q. 729 ( 1995).
202. See. e.g., Susan L. Ettner, New Evidence on the Relationship Between Income and Health, 15 J. HEALTH
ECON. 67 (1996); John D. Graham et al., Poorer is Riskier, 12 RISK ANALYSIS 333 ( 1992); Ralph L. Keeney,
Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, I 0 RISK ANALYSIS 147 (1990).
203. This phrasing is attributed to the late Aaron Wildavsky.
204. WILDA VSKY, supra note 186, at 445.
205. See, e.g, Indur Goklany, Richer Is Cleaner, in THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET (Ronald Bailey ed.,
1995); Frank B. Cross, A Syncretic Perspective on Environmental Protection and Economic Growth, 2 KANSAS
J.L. & PUB. POL 'y 53,61 (1992).
206. Henry I. Miller, supra note 31, at 189.
207. It is important to recognize that the potential for overly stringent regulations to chill technological
development is more than theoretical. For instance, a 1989 survey of agricultural researchers working with GMOs,
20 percent of those in the private sector and ten percent of those in the public sector, elected not to field test GMOs
that they had developed, with approximately 75 percent identifying government regulation as the reason. See
Miller, supra note 39, at 207-08.
208. See Graziano, supra note 3, at 183.
209. See Redick et al., supra note 40, al 31.
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Impact on Food Production

For many environmentalists, the continuing growth in global population is the most
pressing environmental problem. They look with alarm at the dramatic increase in human
numbers over the twentieth century. A century ago there were 1.6 billion people on the
planet. By 1960, global population reached 3 billion and 5 billion by 1987. 210 1999 was
heralded as the year the earth's population reached 6 billion. 211 At present, global numbers
increase by 1 billion people every twelve to thirteen years. While many expect this rate of
increase to slow, most analysts believe that there could be approximately 10 billion people
on the planet by 2050. 212
While not all environmental analysts believe that human populations are nearing the
earth's carrying capacity, 213 it is well accepted that a growing world population means an
escalating potential human impact on the world around us. More people means more
bodies to house and clothe, more consumers to satisfy, and, most relevant to this paper,
more mouths to feed. Whether or not one believes that dramatic increases in population
foretell ecological disaster, agricultural production will need to increase substantially just to
keep pace with the inevitable increase in human numbers. 214 According to the International
Food Policy Research Institute, global demand for basic agricultural commodities, such as
wheat, maize, and rice, will increase an estimated forty percent by 2020, or 1.3 percent per
year. 215
Global food production has kept pace with population increases for the past several
decades, largely due to technological advances in production. Despite proclamations in the
1960s and 1970s that massive famines were imminent and that "[t]he battle to feed all of
humanity is already lost," 216 the world's farmers have met the rising demand for food.
Between the late-1930s and late-1980s, global per capita calorie availability increased
nearly thirty percent, with the largest increases occurring in lesser developed countries in
Africa, Asia, and Latin America. 217 From 1961 to 1994, per capita food production
increased nearly twenty percent, according to independent analyses, 218 and per capita
agriculture production increased nearly as much. 219 The U.N. Food and Agriculture
Organization reached similar conclusions. 220 In developing countries alone, grain yields
rose thirty-two percent from 1980 to 1992. 221
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(Ronald Bailey ed., 1995), and the various works of the late economist Julian Simon.
214. While changes in economic and political arrangements could improve the availability and distribution of
food considerably, such reforms cannot sustain a growing population absent concurrent increases in agricultural
productivity.
215. See Charles C. Mann, Crop Scientists Seek a New Revolution, 283 SCIENCE 310, 310 ( 1999).
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217. See Eberstadt, supra note 213, a! 28.
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Natural Environment and Human Societies, in EARTH REPORT 2000: REVISITING THE TRUE STATE OF THE PLANET
260-61 (Ronald Bailey ed., 1999).
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The rise in food production did not happen by accident. By and large, it was the
product of the so-called "green revolution." The explosion in productivity resulted from
the work of plant breeders, such as Nobel laureate Norman Borlaug, who figured out how
to increase the technological sophistication of agriculture. 222 Using new types of
agricultural chemicals, pest control techniques, and irrigation methods, researchers were
able to increase the per-acre productivity of cropland. But perhaps the most important
element in the revolution was the increased sophistication of plant breeding. As agriculture
expert Dennis Avery explains:
Plant breeders like Norman Borlaug have turned out a profusion of new plant
varieties that start earlier, grow faster, resist pests, tolerate drought stress, and
preserve more of the harvest. Many have shorter stalks so more of their energy
goes into producing grain, and the sturdier stems support bigger seed heads.
Hybridization offers faster gains in yield potential and greater ease in
maintaining the vigor of seed breeding lines. The new crop plants permit higher
yields and more double-cropping, and they protect the land more effectively
than the old "land-race," or farmer-bred, varieties. 223
In other words, increased agricultural production has been the direct result of
"biotechnology": the selective breeding of plant species for particular traits.
The increases in agricultural productivity over the past few decades have been
impressive, but they are not guaranteed to continue. Indeed, annual increases in
agricultural productivity appear to have been slipping; cereal yields per hectare rose 2.2
percent per year in the late 1960s and 1970s, but only 1.5 percent per year in the 1980s and
early 1990s. 224 Some scientists believe that new breakthroughs are imminent, but most
agree that modern biotechnology techniques will be required to continue increases in
agricultural productivity. "We may be able to create the new plant type without biotech,"
commented Shaobing Peng of the International Rice Research Institute, "but that is where
new opportunities will have to come from in the future." 225 According to Science, "[t]o
break yield barriers, the plants will have to be thoroughly reengineered." 226
Genetic modification of crops can increase yields in many ways, ranging from
enhancing plant resistance to frost, pests, soil toxicity or salinity, and droughts, to
regulating flowering and reducing spoilage. A scientific panel convened by the World
Bank and Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) concluded
that genetic engineering could increase agricultural yields by as much as twenty-five
percent. 227 Even delaying ripening in fruits and vegetables could substantially enhance
food supplies, as post-harvest and end-use losses are estimated to be as high as forty-seven
percent. 228
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The harvest-increasing potential of GMOs is already being demonstrated by the first
generation of genetically engineered crops. One prominent GMO is corn modified to
contain a gene from the Bacillus thuringiensis (Bt) bacterium to protect it from pests, such
as European Com Borer, which cause an estimated $1 to $2 billion in crop damage to com
fields each year. 229 Bt occurs in nature and is often cultivated and used as a "natural
pesticide" by farmers. The bacterium protects crops because it produces a protein that is
toxic to the corn borer but is harmless to humans and most other wildlife. Inserting a Bt
gene enables corn plants to produce the defensive protein, protecting them from borers and
reducing crop damage (as well as the need to apply additional Bt or other pesticides). The
result, among other things, is increased productivity. For instance, in 1997 the per-acre
yields of corn modified to produce Bt were seven percent higher than unmodified cornY 0
Bt cotton yields reported in 1996 were even further above conventional crops-fifteen to
seventeen percent higher than unmodified cotton treated with conventional pesticides. 231 A
1999 industry-financed study estimated that farmers produced an additional 60 million
bushels of corn and 85 million pounds of cotton in 1998 with Bt strains. 232
Biotechnology not only holds the potential to increase per-acre yields, it could also
increase the nutritional value of the crops that are grown. This is tremendously important
because an· estimated 800 million people receive insufficient nutrition in their diets. 233
"Modifying the nutritional composition of plant foods is an urgent worldwide health issue
as basic nutritional needs for much of the world's population are still unmet. " 234 Substantial
research in this regard is underway. Scientists have already developed a sweet potato with
greater protein quality, 235 and soybean and corn plants have been modified to improve their
oil, protein, and carbohydrate content. 236 One week before negotiators met in Montreal to
finalize the protocol, researchers announced the creation of a new strain of rice fortified
with additional Vitamin A. 237 The development of this "golden rice" was instantly deemed
a "major advance in global nutrition" because vitamin A deficiency, which can cause
blindness and other ills, affects up to 250 million children worldwide. 238 Genetically
modified crops may well make food both more abundant and more nutritious.
Few would argue at this point in time that bioengineering of crops, in and of itself,
will address all of the globe's future food needs, but the use of bioengineering will be
essential to feed a growing world population especially, as noted below, if we wish to
protect biodiversity at the same time. A biosafety protocol, however, could make this task
that much more difficult by slowing the introduction and development of new productivityenhancing GMOs, particularly in those areas that need them the most.
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Impact on Biodiversity

There are ways to increase food production other than through the development and
use of GMOs. Perhaps the easiest way of producing more food would be to put more acres
under plow. Paul Waggoner, for one, estimates that feeding a global population of 10
billion could readily be achieved by simply doubling the amount of cropland. 239 But at
what cost?
Even if one assumes that lands not already used for farming will match the
productivity of those that are already farmed, there is another problem: most of the land
that would be available for farming is currently undeveloped habitat. Habitat loss is
already one of the greatest threats to biodiversity. Over one-third of documented animal
extinctions were due to habitat destruction/ 40 and most biodiversity experts believe that
continuing loss of habitat could claim at least one quarter of the species alive today. 241
Most habitat loss is caused by human conversion of land to other uses. 242 "In particular,
conversion of land to agriculture is the single greatest agent of habitat conversion, and
associated displacement of species and increasing stress on biological diversity." 243 As a
consequence, if per acre agricultural yields are not increased, biological diversity will be
placed under greater strain.
The importance of agricultural productivity for habitat conservation is readily evident.
Consider that from 1961 to 1993, the earth's population increased eighty percent but
cropland increased only eight percent, despite increases in per capita food supplies. 244 In
other words, increased food demand was met largely by increasing per acre yields. Had
this not been the case and agricultural productivity in 1993 remained what it had been in
1961, producing the same amount of food would have required increasing global cropland
by eighty percent or more. 245 In other words, an additional 3550 million hectares-or
twenty-seven percent of the world's land area (excluding Antarctica)-would have had to
come under plow. 246 This is merely the acceleration of a longer-term trend. Since 1800,
global population has increased approximately six-fold, yet cropland has yet to
quadruple. 247
As noted above, global population may well hit I 0 billion in the next century. This
will require substantial increases in food production. Increasing per capit;;t caloric intake
will require producing even more. This increase will be achieved through some
combination of increases in cropland acreage and increases in agricultural productivity. To
illustrate, increasing agricultural productivity 1.4 percent per year from I 993 to 2050 would
produce an overall increase in agricultural output of I 21 percent. To achieve this same
increase through the use of more cropland alone would probably require increasing the
239. See PAUL E. WAGGONER, HOW MUCH LAND CAN TEN BILLION PEOPLE SPARE FOR NATURE? 26-27
(1994), cited in Goklany,supra note 228, at 115.
240. See Edwards, supra note 48, at 222.
241. See, e.g., Paul 0. Ehrlich & Edward 0. Wilson, Biodiversity Studies: Science and Policy, 253 SCIENCE
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242. See. e.g., Peter M. Vitousek et a!., Human Domination of Earths Ecasystems, 277 SCIENCE 494, 494
(1997).
243. Goklany, supra note 228, at 108.
244. See lndur M. Goklany, Saving Habitat and Conserving Biodiversity on a Crowded Planet, 48
BIOSCIENCE 941, 941 {1998).
245. See id.
246. See id. If anything, this estimate is optimistic, as it assumes that the new cropland acreage would be as
productive as those lands already farmed, a highly unlikely scenario.
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amount of cropland by more than 121 percent, or over 3200 million hectares. 248 Even small
annual changes in productivity can have a big impact on the demand for cropland.
Because of this trade-off in efforts to increase food production between increased
agricultural productivity and cropland acreage, regulations that inhibit the development and
use of agricultural technologies, such as GMOs, could have a negative impact on habitat
conservation. Limiting the availability of GMOs will leave farmers fewer means with
which to increase yields, other than converting habitat to farmland. 249 Allowing more
widespread use of biotechnology, on the other hand, could greatly reduce the stresses
placed upon species habitat by a growing world population.
Biotechnology can help reduce the strain on habitat by increasing per-acre timber
yields as well. Cloned and tissue-cultured strains of Georgia yellow pine are now grown in
Brazil to produce sixteen times as much pulpwood per hectare as a natural forest in
Sweden. 250 As Dennis Avery notes, this means that "each acre of the high-yielding trees
can protect fifteen wild acres from being logged." 251 While commercial logging is not a
major cause of deforestation, it does play a role, and biotechnology can help alleviate some
of this stress. "Just as agriculture reduced food foraging pressures on natural habitats by
increasing crop productivity, so too plantation forests, with their high level of productivity,
are reducing the pressures on the remaining natural forests." 252
Efforts to increase per-acre agricultural yields, whether through biotechnology or
some other means, can have negative environmental impacts. Nonetheless, as John Barton
notes, "the environmental costs of expanding the area tilled are enormously greater than
those of increasing yield." 253 Without the contribution ofnew generations ofGMOs, it will
be immensely difficult to meet the rising food demands of the world's peoples and still
preserve large areas of undeveloped habitat. Thus, adoption of a precautionary biosafety
protocol could well counteract other efforts under the CBD to protect biological diversity.
3.

Potential for Rent Seeking

While environmental regulations are typically promoted as measures to protect public
health or improve environmental quality, there are often other motivations at work. As
with most other sorts of policy, special interest politics can influence the shape and course
of environmental measures. 254 Recall the example of reformulated gasoline regulation cited
above. 255 In that instance, the EPA was well aware that its regulation could cause more
harm than good. Indeed, the history behind the proposed ethanol rule suggests that it was
politics, not environmental protection, driving the EPA's decision. 256 In promulgating the
ethanol rule, EPA Administrator Carol Browner and Agriculture Secretary Mike Espy
248. See id. at 120.
249. Given environmentalist pressures for farmers to reduce the use of agricultural chemicals, this is an even
greater concern. Without access to GMOs or agricultural chemicals, farmers will be very constrained in their
ability to increase yields.
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254. See, e.g., ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS, PRIVATE REWARDS (MichaelS. Greve & Fred L.
Smith eds., 1992).
255. See supra note 197 and accompanying text.
256. See generally Jonathan H. Adler, Clean Fuels, Dirty Air, in ENVIRONMENTAL POLITICS: PUBLIC COSTS,
PRIVATE REWARDS (Michael S. Greve & Fred L. Smith eds., 1992).
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explicitly acknowledged that the rule was issued, in part, to assuage the concerns of the
ethanol industry. 257
International trade policy is potentially subject to greater rent-seeking pressures than
most areas. The primary instruments of trade policy-tariffs and subsidies-have little
economic value other than to provide concentrated benefits to particular interest groups at
the expense of the larger public. Industries that traditionally sought protection from global
competition through tariffs and other trade barriers see a new opportunity in the push for
increased international environmental efforts. "Because environmental standards have a
growing national constituency, they are especially attractive candidates for disguised
protectionism," notes C. Ford Runge of the University of Minnesota. 258 Daniel Esty, who
participated in the NAFTA negotiations on behalf of the EPA, concurs, noting that
"environmental standards can be crafted chiefly to benefit domestic producers, not to
protect the environment." 259 Allowing importing nations to restrict imports of GMOs, or
products derived from GMOs, would create tremendous pressure for the erection of trade
barriers, particularly if nations are not required to provide a scientific basis for their
decision. As attorney Thomas Redick notes, "[m]any developing countries would like
'socioeconomic' impacts of GMOs to be a factor in risk assessment, allowing trade barriers
to protect local interests." 260 Article 26 of the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety provides
just such a mechanism. 261
A prominent example of alleged trade protectionism disguised as environmental
protection is the European Community's 1989 ban on the importation of U.S. beef
produced with bovine growth hormones. Most observers see this action as an attempt to
exclude U.S. producers from the lucrative European beef and offal markets. 262
Nonetheless, the European Union defended the restriction as a health measure despite the
lack of any credible scientific evidence indicating that the use of the hormones in beef
production had any negative health impacts. Growth hormones occur naturally in beef,
scientists note, dismissing the European claims that the hormones pose a health risk. 263
Thus, in 1997, a WTO dispute resolution panel sided with the United States, ruling that the
import ban was a protectionist measure and not a neutral environmental regulation. The
European Union appealed, but to no avail, as the WTO panel again sided with the United
States. As this is being written, the European Union continues to maintain that the ban is
justified, and is resisting compliance with the WTO ruling. 264
Regrettably, these sorts of disputes are only likely to become more common. "If
anything, the temptation to use environmental and health standards to deny access to home
markets is stronger now than in the 1980s," notes Runge. 265 As the use of GMOs boosts
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agricultural productivity, farmers in some countries will increase pressure on domestic
politicians to "protect" them from foreign competition. The fact that a product was made
with or from GMOs could be used as a pretense for protectionist trade measures. Insofar as
such restrictions are permitted under the biosafety protocol, this may make it difficult to
counter protectionist measures through the WTO. Indeed, then-Undersecretary of State
Stuart Eizenstat alleged that the European Union's insistence on a mandate for labeling
GMO-derived products is simply a pretense "to justify keeping its trade restrictions in
place." 266
It should go without saying that increased trade protectionism under the guise of
environmental protection would impose a substantial toll on consumers and producers. 267
Consumers would be faced with fewer choices and be forced to pay higher prices for
agricultural products. Similarly, producers would face smaller markets. The beef hormone
dispute alone was estimated to cost U.S. beef producers $100 million. 268 Insofar as the
dispute triggered retaliatory measures by the United States, it costs tens of millions more.

Trade restrictions on GMOs and other agricultural products could also have a
negative environmental impact, further demonstrating the peril of adopting "precautionary"
measures. As Interior Department analyst Indur Goklany notes, international trade "helps
to reduce the exploitation of marginal lands for growing crops. " 269 This is because
international trade allows specialization at the global level, so that crops are grown on the
most productive lands. A shortage in one part of the world can be compensated for by a
surplus in another. Goklany estimates that had there been no international trade in cereals,
an additional 35 million hectares would have needed to be harvested in !993 to maintain
existing production levels. 270 International trade is also a key component of economic
growth, which is necessary to sustain the technological development and willingness-to-pay
upon which much environmental protection relies. 271 Thus, insofar as the Cartagena
Protocol on Biosafety provides a new avenue for protectionists to erect trade barriers, it
could have substantial negative impacts on economic well-being, as well as environmental
protection.

V.

CONCLUSION

Genetic engineering, like any technology, can pose new risks. That alone is
insufficient to justify regulation, international or otherwise. For while new technologies
pose risks, they also present benefits-benefits that cannot be realized if the risks are
avoided at all costs. In the case of crops, the risks of accidentally introducing a new pest
species or "contaminating" the wild must be weighed against the risks posed by a growing
world population and demands for increased food production. From the standpoint of
biodiversity, it is difficult to argue that the risks posed by biotechnology are greater than
the risks it could alleviate. The loss of biodiversity due to conversion of habitat into com
fields is as irreversible as the accidental introduction of a genetically engineered species.
environmental issues will be used by rich countries as yet another excuse to adopt protectionist policies."
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The precautionary principle should not alter this evaluation for two reasons. First,
insofar as the precautionary principle asks that a technology be demonstrated to be without
risk, it is asking the impossible. "The best that research can do is narrow the limits on
uncertainties, not eradicate them. " 272 Second, and perhaps more important, as noted
throughout this paper, the lack of biotechnology also poses risks. If the goal is to minimize
risk, the focus should be on which risk is greater-the risk of a new technology, or the risk
of doing without it. In this respect, the precautionary principle is rarely applied
evenhandedly. That is, rarely are governmental actions subjected to the same scrutiny, the
same proof of "no harm" that new technologies are. Indeed, precautionary regulation
reverses the traditional presumption under the American constitutional scheme, that the
burden should be on the government to identify the interest that justifies its restriction of
private activity. 273
Advocates of a precautionary approach to new technologies stress that greater
regulation is justified by uncertainty. Yet this same argument can be made against the
regulation of new innovations. It is certainly true that new technologies can pose unknown
risks; a technology that appears relatively benign today may be revealed to have a
disturbing potential to cause harm tomorrow. By the same token, regulations that seem to
improve safety and environmental protection may in fact cause substantial harm. 274
Government regulations can have as many unintended consequences as technological
advances. 275 The presence of uncertainty about a technology, without more, cannot
establish a presumption that more regulation is required.
The Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety, like many of the international environmental
agreements that have gone before it, suffers from this defect. While meeting delegates paid
lip-service to the beneficial impact advances in biotechnology could have, they negotiated a
treaty that could forestall many of those benefits. Ironically, it is the people of the
developing world, and global biodiversity, which may end up suffering the most. A
stringent biosafety protocol is unlikely to make the world any safer, but it certainly could
make us more sorry than safe.
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As Wildavsky notes,

The immensity of the change requires reemphasis: private action requires proof of the absence of
harm; governmental action requires no proof of harm. The relative role of the citizen and the state
have been reversed. In the past it was the citizen who was entitled to act and the state that had to
justify its intervention; now it is the state that intervenes by right and the citizen who has to give
reasons for acting. The reversal of the usual course of action has profound implications.
WILDAVSKY, supra note 188, at 430.
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275. It should be noted that private companies that market dangerous technologies are typically more
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